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Background: Swaziland has the highest national incidence of tuberculosis (TB) in the world, with treatment success
rates well below the 85 % international target. Treatment support as part of comprehensive TB services is a core
component of the Stop TB Strategy. This study investigated the effects of financial incentives for treatment supporters on
TB treatment outcomes in Swaziland.
Methods: This was a controlled study that compared treatment outcomes for patients with a treatment supporter who
received or did not receive a financial incentive.
Results: The intervention group had a higher chance of treatment success as compared with the control group: 73 %
(95 % confidence intervals [CIs] 66–80 %) versus 60 % (95 % CIs 57–64 %), respectively, p = 0.003. This improvement
remained significant when treatment success rates were adjusted for differences in baseline characteristics, with the
effect of incentivised treatment supporters on treatment outcomes having an odds ratio (OR) of 1.8. There was also a
significant improvement in the death rate in the intervention group, as compared with the control group (10.6 versus
23.5 %, p = <0.001).
Conclusion: Incentives provided to TB treatment supporters appear to significantly improve TB treatment outcomes.
Incentivising treatment support may be appropriate as an effective addition to support and supervision measures
(199 words).
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Adherence to drug treatment and appointments for tuber-
culosis (TB) is critical to prevent drug resistance. The Stop
TB Strategy places a significant emphasis on patient sup-
port and supervision as part of the comprehensive TB ser-
vices, including directly observed therapy (DOT) [1].
However, evidence about the effectiveness of DOT is lim-
ited and this therapy can be a considerable burden for* Correspondence: meravkliner@nhs.net
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unless otherwise stated.patients and healthcare services, as it requires staff to visit
patients and observe them taking medication each day [2].
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that
patients get themselves a treatment supporter, who may ei-
ther be a health worker or a trained and supervised mem-
ber of the community or family, on diagnosis [3]. The
treatment supporter should share responsibility for comple-
tion of treatment and should provide treatment supervi-
sion, which may include DOT as well as social and
psychological support.
Incentives for provision of treatment support, such as
food and travel costs for appointments, may be appro-
priate in order to support a patient with their treatment.
A 2011 Cochrane Review of randomised controlled trials
(RCTs) investigating the impact of material incentives in
the investigation or treatment of TB, identified 11his is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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USA among vulnerable groups such as drug users,
homeless people and prisoners. Only one study of 265
patients in Timor-Leste considered the effects of finan-
cial incentives on treatment outcomes; the study didn’t
find any effect on the outcomes [5]. Another study, not
included in the Cochrane Review, about monetary incen-
tives for TB treatment in Ecuador, found that the na-
tional programme of financial incentives reduced default
rates from treatment from 26 to 9 % [6], and alleviated
the financial burden of treatment for patients. A prag-
matic cluster RCT in South Africa, which compared
treatment outcomes among patients who received a
voucher and those who didn’t, found no difference in
treatment outcomes between the two groups [7]. A
controlled before-and-after study of rural-to-urban mi-
grants in China found a significant increase in treat-
ment completion in those receiving financial incentives
[8]. No studies were identified that focused on incen-
tives been given to treatment supporters rather than
directly to the patients.
Swaziland is a landlocked country situated in Southern
Africa, bordering Mozambique and South Africa. The
country’s key indicators are outlined in Table 1. Swaziland
has the highest national incidence of TB in the world at
1382 per 100,000, with rates increasing 5-fold over the past
10 years [9]. The TB incidence is fuelled by poverty, poor
housing, overcrowding, malnutrition and a poor healthcare
infrastructure, but is mainly related to the country’s HIV
burden, which, with a prevalence of 17 %, is also one of the
highest in the world [10]. In 2013, 74 % of new TB cases
were co-infected with HIV [10]. The international target,
for TB treatment success was originally set by the World
Health Assembly in 1991 and was incorporated into the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). TB treatment
success in Swaziland is 72 %, considerably lower than the
international target of 85 % [10,11]. Multidrug resistant
(MDR) TB rates are high at 8 and 34 % of new and re-
treated patients, respectively [12].
The National TB Programme and regional government
offices manage the TB burden in Swaziland. There are a
number of government and non-governmental hospitalsTable 1 Key indicators for Swaziland [22]
Total population (2013) 1,250,000
Gross national income per capita ($, 2013) 6,220
Literacy rates in over 15s (%) 87.8
Life expectancy at birth m/f (years, 2012) 52/55
Prevalence of HIV among adults aged 15–49 (%) 27.4 (26.6–28.1)
Deaths due to HIV/AIDS per 100,000 population 443
Incidence of TB (per 100,000 population per year) 1382 (1220–1541)
Case detection rate (all forms TB) (%) 38 (34–44)and clinics that provide diagnosis and treatment for the
majority of TB patients. Patients are diagnosed with TB
on sputum smear and culture. After initiation on TB
treatment, if patients do not improve and sputum fails
to convert to smear negative, the patient is referred to
the national TB hospital. This hospital diagnoses, admits
and treats MDR TB patients. Community-based organi-
sations (CBOs) provide support to the community on a
wide range of social and health issues, including support
for TB treatment.
To improve treatment success rates and consequently
achieve the international target, a number of interven-
tions are being tested in the country, including compre-
hensive provision of treatment support for TB. The
Swaziland Tuberculosis Emergency Response Plan rec-
ommends DOT for all TB patients, and provides patient
support and incentives for treatment support [13].
Across Swaziland, incentives were provided to 12 CBOs
to support DOT through external funding from The
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(Global Fund), via the National TB Programme. The
CBOs were advised to spend the funding as required in
order to increase treatment completion. A multi-centre
study, which includes treatment outcomes for patients
supported across all 12 CBOs, including the Good Shep-
herd Hospital (GSH), will be published soon. The multi-
centre study investigates the impact of different methods
of using financial incentives, including the provision of
financial incentives directly to patients.
This study presents the findings from the GSH TB
Programme, the CBO supporting the largest number of
patients in the multi-centre study. This CBO chose to
use the funding to provide incentives to treatment sup-
porters, as one method of providing financial incentives
for the programme. This single-centre study aimed to
assess the impact on treatment outcomes of providing fi-
nancial incentives directly to TB treatment supporters.
Methods
We adopted a pragmatic controlled interventional study
design to investigate the effects of incentives for treat-
ment supporters on treatment outcomes in patients di-
agnosed with TB at the GSH in Lubombo, a rural
district in Swaziland, which has a population of over
200,000. The GSH is the regional hospital in Lubombo
and is the diagnostic centre for TB.
Study population
We included all patients diagnosed with TB between 1st
January 2010 and 30th September 2011 at the GSH.
Patients were divided into the intervention and control
groups, which was determined depending on where they
lived. As this was a pragmatic study, the GSH already
had a small number of volunteer community support
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treatment support to HIV patients. Thus, those who
lived in the same community as a CSW were included in
the intervention group. Those who lived in other com-
munities were included in the control group (standard
care).
Intervention
Both the control and the intervention groups received
treatment support from a trained treatment supporter.
This included: DOT, appointment reminders, support
getting to clinics, and social and psychological support.
Following the national guidelines, all TB patients were
asked to identify and bring a family or community mem-
ber to the appointment at which TB treatment was initi-
ated. The control group received treatment support
from their family or community member. The interven-
tion group received treatment support from a CSW,
who was given a monthly financial incentive for each pa-
tient under his or her care while the patient remained
on TB treatment. This small incentive was to cover
travel for the CSW to the clinic with (or on behalf of )
the patient and to provide food or other supplies to aid
the patient’s recovery. In essence, this was a minimal sti-
pend to show treatment supporters appreciation for
expending resources as they carried out their work.
The CSWs were originally recruited as HIV commu-
nity workers in 2005 and received initial training in
HIV/AIDS and communication skills in a 2-day work-
shop. They then delivered weekly support groups for
HIV patients within their respective communities. They
continued to work on a voluntary basis with the GSH
from 2005 until after the study period, with regular
monthly training sessions. They were chosen to be in-
volved in the intervention due to their close working re-
lationship with the hospital.
The family/community member and the patient re-
ceived the same education and training by the nurse in
the treatment clinic. The CSWs received the same TB
treatment support training as the family/community
member prior to the start of the intervention. The pa-
tients themselves did not receive a financial incentive as
the treatment supporter provided the intervention. The
CSWs received payment equivalent to US $5.75 per
month for each patient and an additional payment
equivalent to US $34.40 for each patient who completed
treatment or was cured after 6 months. This was deter-
mined based on the overall funds available and weighted
to incentivise treatment completion.
Outcome measures
Following the WHO definitions for TB treatment out-
comes [14], the primary outcome measure was the pro-
portion of patients with treatment success: treatmentcompletion or cure. Secondary outcomes were the rates
of other treatment outcomes (treatment completion,
cure, default, death, treatment failure and transferred
out) in the intervention group compared with the con-
trol group.
Data collection and analysis
We collected treatment outcomes from the TB register
at the GSH (hard copy) and identified those receiving
the intervention through their unique national TB num-
ber. A data entry clerk entered the data into Microsoft
Access. Baseline characteristics were limited to the data
that were routinely collected by the TB register. This in-
cluded: age, sex, TB category, site of disease, HIV status
and whether a patient was initiated on HIV treatment.
We compared the baseline characteristics of the inter-
vention and control groups using the chi-square test.
We compared the proportion of patients who had
treatment success in the intervention and control groups
using a chi-squared test for Fisher’s exact test of inde-
pendence, where appropriate. In order to estimate the
effect of having an incentivised treatment supporter on
the success of treatment, a logistic regression model was
implemented, utilising forward stepwise selection to
identify covariates one by one that had to be included in
the model, based on the results of the likelihood ratio
test. The covariates entered into the model were pre-
specified, and it was hypothesised before building the
model that they may have a confounding effect. The
model produced estimates of the coefficients and the
corresponding standard errors for each covariate in-
cluded in the model, alongside a Wald chi-square value
and corresponding p-value, which were used to test the
null hypothesis that the coefficient’s true value is zero.
Confidence intervals (CIs) of 95 % were used to deter-
mine whether coefficients are significantly different from
0. Odds ratios (ORs) were also generated for each covar-
iate. Analysis was undertaken using SPSS Statistics ver-
sion 19.
Sample size calculation
A treatment success rate of 72 % was assumed, which
was the national treatment success rate in 2010 when
this study was undertaken [15]. We estimated that a
13 % increase in treatment success would be relevant for
the public health programme, as it would increase treat-
ment success to the Stop TB target of 85 %. Using alpha
of 0.05, power of 0.9 and 900 patients in the control
group, a sample size of 92 in the intervention group was
required.
Ethics
This study was approved by the Swaziland Ministry of
Health Ethics Committee, reference MH-599C.
Table 3 Treatment outcomes for control and intervention
groups
Control N,% (95 %
CI)
Intervention N,%
(95 % CI)
p-value
Treatment success 553, 60.4 % 117, 72.7 % 0.003*
(57.2–63.5 %) (65.8–79.6 %)
Treatment
completion
423, 46.2 % 98, 60.9 % 0.001*
(43.0–49.4 %) (53.4–68.4 %)
Cure 130, 14.2 % 19, 11.8 % 0.426
(11.9–16.5 %) (6.8–16.8 %)
Incomplete
treatment
339, 37.0 % 40, 24.8 % 0.003*
(33.9–40.1 %) (18.1–31.5 %)
Default 98, 10.7 % 14, 8.7 % 0.443
(8.7–12.7 %) (4.3–13.1 %)
Death 215, 23.5 % 17, 10.6 % <0.001*
(20.8–26.2 %) (5.8–15.4 %)
Treatment failure 26, 2.8 % 9, 5.6 % 0.069
(1.7–3.9 %) (2.0–9.2 %)
Transferred out 24, 2.6 % 4, 2.5 % 1.000
(1.6–3.6 %) (0.1–4.9 %)
* p-value <0.05 i.e. statistically significant
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Of the 1077 patients initiated on TB treatment between
1st January 2010 and 30th September 2011 at the GSH,
916 patients received standard care (control group) and
161 patients received support from treatment supporters
who were given financial incentives (intervention group).
The baseline characteristics of the two groups are pre-
sented in Table 2. There were no statistical differences
for age and gender between the two groups, but they did
differ in HIV status, with the intervention group having
a lower proportion of patients with co-infection (77.4
versus 68.9 %, p = 0.021).
Table 3 outlines treatment outcomes for the control and
intervention groups. The intervention group had a higher
chance of treatment success as compared with the control
group: 72.7 % (117/161, 95 % CI 65.8–79.6 %) versus
60.4 % (553/916, 95 % CI 57.2–63.5 %), p = 0.003.
A summary of the logistic regression model, which the
forward stepwise selection method generated, is provided
in Table 4. The model produced a likelihood ratio test stat-
istic of 1086.058 and a Nagelkerke’s R square value of
0.159. All selected covariates were significantly different
from zero. The following covariates were selected for inclu-
sion in the model: age, TB category, HIV positive status,
whether the patient was on ART and whether the patient
had a treatment supporter. All selected covariates wereTable 2 Baseline characteristics of patients
Control
(N, %)
Intervention
(N, %)
p-value
Total 916 161
Male sex 457 (50.1) 72 (44.7) 0.203
Age
0–14 years 172 (18.8) 27 (16.8) 0.545
15–34 years 410 (44.8) 76 (47.2) 0.565
≥35 years 333 (36.4) 57 (35.4) 0.817
Unknown 1 (0.1) 1 (0.6)
TB category
I (any new case) 671 (73.3) 130 (80.7) 0.051
II (previously treated TB/TB
meningitis)
135 (14.8) 14 (8.7) 0.039*
III (children under 8) 107 (11.7) 17 (10.6) 0.671
Unknown 3 (0.3) 0 (0)
Pulmonary disease 650 (71.0) 120 (74.5) 0.601
HIV status
Reactive 707 (77.4) 111 (68.9) 0.021*
Non-reactive 184 (20.2) 47 (29.2) 0.010*
Test not done 18 (2.0) 2 (1.2) 0.755
Unknown 4 (0.4) 1 (0.6)
On HIV treatment 521 (73.7) 90 (81.1) 0.160
*p-value <0.05 i.e. statistically significantsignificantly different from zero (age, p = 0.000; TB cat-
egory, p = 0.038; HIV positive status, p = 0.000; on ART,
p = 0.000; treatment supporter, p = 0.08). Having an
incentivised treatment supporter was shown to increase
the chances of TB treatment success (OR = 1.826).
Incomplete treatment rates (including death, default and
treatment failure) were significantly lower in the interven-
tion group compared with the control (24.8 versus 37.0 %,
p = 0.003). This was mainly due to the significant reduction
in death in the intervention group compared with theTable 4 Summary of the logistic regression model
Covariate Coefficient Standard
error
(coefficient)
Wald
chi-
square
value
p-value OR
Age (reference
category 35+)
21.651 .000*
0–14 years 2.081 .458 20.609 .000* 8.016
15–24 years .273 .155 3.090 .079 1.314
TB (reference
category 3)
6.546 .038*
1 .843 .502 2.819 .093 2.324
2 .416 .527 .624 .430 1.516
HIV positive −1.371 .241 32.249 .000* .254
On ART 1.119 .181 38.177 .000* 3.061
Incentivised
treatment supporter
.602 .227 7.018 .008* 1.826
Constant -.011 .538 .000 .984 .990
* p-value <0.05 i.e. statistically significant
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23.5 % (215/916, 95 % CI 20.8–26.2 %), p = <0.001. There
was no significant difference observed in patients defaulting
(11 versus 9 %, p = 0.443).
Discussion
This pragmatic controlled intervention study suggests
that financial incentives for treatment supporters are
beneficial in improving treatment outcomes. Patients
who were supported by financially incentivised treat-
ment supporters had higher rates of treatment success
than those receiving standard care (72.7 % compared to
60.4 %). After adjusting for confounding factors
(including age, sex and HIV status), patients who were
supported by treatment supporters receiving financial
incentives were 1.8 times more likely to complete treat-
ment than those receiving standard care. In addition, the
death rate was significantly reduced in the intervention
group, compared with the control group, which may be
clinically significant for a country with high mortality
from TB. There is limited published evidence on incen-
tives to improve TB treatment outcomes, with no de-
cisive answer on whether they do in fact improve
outcomes [4–8]. This paper adds to this literature from
a variety of settings.
Improving TB treatment success is a priority in
Swaziland, and in other countries with high burdens of
TB and scarce resources. A number of interventions
have been undertaken in Swaziland to reduce the burden
of disease including household contact tracing [16], in-
tensified case finding [17] and integrated HIV/TB com-
munity clinics [18]. Approaches to improving treatment
outcomes may be of significant benefit to other high in-
cident settings.
Incomplete TB treatment can lead to the development
of drug resistance, which can lead to poorer health out-
comes for the population. In addition, drug resistance is
costly, as it often requires extended hospital admissions,
more expensive drugs and long treatment periods [19].
Treatment of MDR TB in Southern Africa has cost over
$15,000 per patient [20]. It is likely to be beneficial to in-
vest in improving adherence and treatment success to
prevent future costs and improve health.
There were a number of limitations to this study. The
control group had significantly lower treatment success
rates than the national figure. There is no clear explan-
ation why this may be, but this does suggest underlying
problems with local TB services and reflects regional dif-
ferences in treatment outcomes. This difference in treat-
ment success rates is not clearly explained in this study
and will be further explored in the larger multi-centre
study that is currently being undertaken. A 2004 study
conducted in the area found a treatment success rate of
66 % in patients receiving family member treatmentsupport [21]. As treatment success rates in this study
were lower than expected, our previous sample size cal-
culation was not valid. The revised power calculation
found that the study was adequately powered at 80 % to
detect a 12 % difference in treatment success from 60 to
72 %, with 900 controls and 130 in the intervention
group.
This study only investigated incentives given directly
to treatment supporters. The intervention was at the
treatment supporter level, but only data on the treat-
ment outcomes in the patients were collected, without
an analysis of the impact of the characteristics on the
treatment supporters themselves. This data were not
routinely collected and therefore were not able to be
presented. The study does not consider the impact of
different methods of provision of financial incentives, for
example comparing providing incentives to treatment
supporters with providing financial support for the treat-
ment itself, such as paying for transport or food costs.
This would provide policy- and decision-makers with in-
formation on the different options for incentivising
treatment support. The wider multi-centre study will in-
vestigate these differences.
A further limitation was that this was a pragmatic
intervention study, and therefore randomisation of par-
ticipants was not possible. Community support workers
could only provide treatment support in the communi-
ties where they lived, which increased the risk of con-
founding factors influencing the study results. There
was a significant difference in HIV status between the
two groups, which suggests a sampling bias. The HIV
population may have been provided with additional
support through HIV treatment and care, which may
also increase the compliance with TB treatment and
treatment outcomes. This has been accounted for in
the multiple logistic regression analysis. With this dif-
ference in HIV status adjusted for, patients supported
by treatment supporters receiving financial incentives
are 1.8 times more likely to complete treatment than
those receiving standard care. The CSWs from the
GSH live close to the hospital. This means that the
intervention group included patients who lived in the
area surrounding the hospital, while patients living out-
side the intervention area were included in the control
group. As the study was not randomised, there may be
an inherent difference between the intervention and
control groups, as patients living further from the hos-
pital may be poorer and more rural than those living
nearer to the hospital. In particular, those living closer
to the hospital might get better access to TB treatment,
care and support. Lastly, the CSWs received some HIV
and general training before the study began (not in
TB), and therefore may have more skills in communica-
tion and health services than family members.
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from an unpaid treatment supporter or family member.
As this was a pragmatic study, it was not possible to in-
vestigate whether patients in the control group actually
received support from their treatment supporter. This is
one of the difficulties of relying on unpaid treatment
supporters.
The study was conducted in a single treatment centre
(GSH) in rural Swaziland and therefore these results
may not be generalisable to the rest of Southern Africa.
Further evaluation is required to assess the benefits in
other centres, using a multi-centre trial, and will be in-
cluded in the future study.
In this setting, incentives were provided through exter-
nal funding from the Global Fund, through the National
TB Programme. Sustaining funding for this project is
important as financial incentives were found to be effect-
ive in improving treatment outcomes. This evidence will
help to inform policymakers when developing TB sup-
port services in resource-limited settings.
Conclusion
It appears that incentives provided to TB treatment sup-
porters significantly improve TB treatment outcomes.
There may be cost implications for TB programmes,
however, incentivising treatment support may be appro-
priate as part of a comprehensive programme that
moves towards achieving the international target of 85 %
treatment success.
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